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ON THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Katayoun Hosseinnejad 
 
Abstract: This paper sets out a theoretical approach to the nature of interpretation that is 
intended to overcome some of the challenges of treaty interpretation in international law. By 
adhering to the approaches of Gadamer and Wittgenstein, it is argued that interpretation is a 
reciprocal dialogue between the reader and text with the mediation of the ‘tradition’ and 
‘language-games’. Although it seems there exists no agreement among legal theorists on the 
nature of interpretation, reviewing their approaches reveals that they have acknowledged the 
dependency of meaning upon the traditions and practices of communities. This finding paves 
the way for providing a new reading for the system of interpretation provided by articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It is argued that although the 
VCLT integrates some of the elements of current interpretive methods, ultimately the VCLT 
adopts its own unique approach. The nature of international law requires taking into account 
the ‘conventionalist theory’ to determine meaning based on the acts of the law’s subjects. 
Nevertheless, the nature of interpretation requires that the terms be understood with the 
mediation of the ‘language-games’ which is realised by the inclusion of ‘the relevant rules of 
international law’. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The centrality of interpretation to the law in general lies in two of law’s inherent features. On 
one hand, law, as ‘the projection of an imagined future upon reality’,1 needs to predict the 
future. This legal prediction, however, suffers from two main human failings – in HLA Hart’s 
words, these are human beings’ relative ignorance of facts and their relative indeterminacy of 
aim.2 On the other hand, in its search for justice, the law tries to balance the concepts of the 
‘self’ and the ‘other’, and therefore, as Michel Rosenfeld describes, avoids speaking in the 
voice of either one of them; rather, the law embraces a universal language that transcends the 
individualities of all the selves that come within its sweep.3 The gap between ‘singular and 
universal’ or ‘abstract and concrete’, however, cannot be surmounted without violence: every 
insistence on the self-claim is bound to do violence to the other, and every restraint in pursuing 
the self-claim does violence to itself. That is why legal interpretation, according to Robert 
Cover ‘takes place in a field of pain and death’.4 
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In international law, the articulation of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT has not 
reduced the complexity of legal interpretation. Rather, it has mainly shifted the focus of 
scholars from the ‘nature’ of interpretation, which requires theoretical treatment, to the ‘how’ 
of the interpretation. However, this scholarly shift in focus largely neglects the fact that, in the 
absence of a theoretical approach to interpretation in international law, articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT are downgraded to describing some techniques of interpretation which at best can 
serve as rhetorical tools. A brief review of the adjudication practices under the VCLT reveals 
just how far the practice of interpretation stands from the underlying objectives of the VCLT’s 
rules of interpretation: certainty and non-arbitrariness.5 
This paper seeks to provide a theoretical approach to the nature of interpretation by 
resorting to philosophical and linguistic insights on interpretation and meaning, with the aim 
of overcoming some of the challenges of treaty interpretation in international law. However, 
this paper is by no means a comprehensive treatment of interpretation; it is only the first step 
in determining the foundational elements thereof. Therefore, issues such as practical methods 
of interpretation, inter-temporal law, and evolutive interpretation fall outside the direct scope 
of this paper. 
Section B takes the theories of Gadamer and Wittgenstein as starting points for 
shedding light on the nature of interpretation. This section starts with a brief review of the 
evolution of the concept of interpretation, from its beginnings in techniques used to extract 
meaning from texts, to a philosophical subject that, by questioning the existence of objective 
knowledge, focuses on the interplays between the text, the author, and the reader. Based on the 
philosophical approaches of Gadamer and Wittgenstein, this section suggests that 
interpretation cannot be reduced to bare text or to the original intentions of authors. Rather, 
interpretation is a reciprocal dialogue between the reader and text, mediated by the traditions 
and practices of particular communities. 
Section C studies the approaches of legal theorists to interpretation, with the aim of 
showing that such a philosophical linguistic insight can be tracked in their theories. The change 
in the philosophical paradigm of knowledge and being bears on legal theories and the 
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conception of law in general. As a result, either the traditional theories have evolved in a way 
to encompass such insights, or new theories and approaches have emerged. The inclusion of 
the ‘internal point of view’ as an integral element of the concept of law in the theories of major 
legal positivists such as HLA Hart, Joseph Raz and Hans Kelsen, is an acknowledgment of the 
claim by hermeneutic theorists that ‘it is inherently paradoxical to study human beings, who 
have a particular subjective point of view, from a detached and external perspective’. 6 For 
example, in determining what is the norm, Kelsen maintains that in order for the act of will to 
have objective meaning, the ‘ought’ should be considered as an ‘ought’, ‘not only from the 
point of view of the individual who has performed the act, but from the point of view of the 
individual at whose behavior the act is directed, and of a third individual not involved in the 
relation between the two’.7 
Subsequently, legal interpretation, as an important subject within the conceptualisation 
of law, was transformed from a mere technical tool into a concept that could itself serve as the 
basis for a legal theory. There are still, however, international law scholars who follow the 
Classics and advocate using certain techniques of interpretation without seeing any need to lay 
down any foundation for the concept of interpretation. Although their works are very influential 
and important, they fall outside the scope of this paper.8 This is also true of the work of Emer 
de Vattel and Hugo Grotius, as they clearly belong to the traditional way of thinking about 
interpretation. 
This study will be done by using the methodology offered for studying ‘contested 
concepts’, as there seems to be no agreement among scholars on the nature of interpretation.9 
Understanding ‘interpretation’ as a contested concept suggests a theoretical research method 
that goes beyond appeal to empirical evidences, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone, 
because each definition of the contested concept is based upon divergent patterns of thought. 
Therefore, different theoretical opinions on the subject will be examined with the aim to 
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demonstrate the relations between the rival uses of such a concept in different legal thoughts, 
since these disagreements are not ‘haphazard or random, but will tend to be mutually supportive 
or interlocking’.10 
Section D provides a new reading of articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT based upon the 
conception of interpretation as the reciprocal interaction between the text and the reader, with 
the mediation of tradition and practice. It will be argued that while the system of interpretation 
provided by VCLT recognises the value of the text, intention, and purpose of law in the process 
of interpretation, the VCLT provides its own approach to interpretation. 
 
B. PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION 
In its early days, interpretation was conceived of only as a collection of specialised techniques 
for revealing the original meaning of literary and religious texts.11 For example, Greek and 
Roman rhetoricians developed a system of argumentation of which one branch was concerned 
with the proper interpretation of legal texts.12 For them, the word ‘canon’ meant a technical 
rule of grammar under which a word’s meaning or usage could be ascertained. 13  These 
traditional methods of interpretation relied on Aristotelian analysis, according to which a text 
was thought to present a series of reasoned positions that were available for analysis by anyone 
trained in logical operations. Most importantly, the text was thought to contain a unitary 
meaning that corresponded to the author’s intention.14 As a result of this thinking, the Classical 
scholars would propose a list of maxims for interpretation, without seeing any need to lay down 
a theory about the concept of interpretation. It is in this tradition that the work of Grotius and 
Vattel on interpretation should be understood. Grotius, for instance, presents a great number of 
maxims, including the best interpretation of sentences such as ‘Carthage shall be free’.15 Much 
the same is true of Vattel’s work, which supplies a long list of maxims founded on ‘reason and 
authorized by the law of nature’, to be applied in accordance with the circumstances.16 
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Co 2001) 11. 
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15 Jan Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), 
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It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘understanding’ was considered as a general 
problem requiring philosophical treatment. Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose work forms part 
of the foundation of modern hermeneutics, changed the paradigm of interpretation by 
recognising that ‘the possibility of misunderstanding is universal’. 17  For Schleiermacher, 
interpretation and understanding were closely interwoven, like the outer and the inner word, 
and therefore, every problem of interpretation was, in fact, a problem of understanding. Thus, 
it is no surprise that he defines hermeneutics as ‘the art of avoiding misunderstandings’.18 
Schleiermacher’s theory of interpretation, which can be summarised in his famous formula ‘to 
understand a writer better than he understood himself’, was meant to achieve understanding by 
the ‘reconstruction of the production’ which ‘inevitably renders many things conscious of 
which the writer may be unconscious’.19 
The interplay between a text, its meaning, and the reader reaches its momentum by the 
ontological-linguistic turn taken by Martin Heidegger, and Gadamer who asserts that ‘being 
that can be understood is language’.20 Language as the medium in which understanding and 
agreement concerning an object occur, however, is not the focus of hermeneutics. The focus, 
according to Gadamer, is on the reciprocal relationship between the text and the reader.21 
Gadamer rejects dividing the hermeneutic problem between the subjectivity of the interpreter 
and the objectivity of the meaning. Rather, he asserts that interpreters will approach a text with 
certain ‘pre-understandings’ about the text, which Gadamer calls ‘prejudices’. Prejudice – 
which does not necessarily mean false judgment – is a condition for all understanding.22 
Gadamer defines ‘prejudice’ as a ‘judgment that is rendered before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been finally examined’.23  These judgments are conditioned by 
history and tradition, thus it is the tradition that ‘determines in advance both what seems to us 
worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation’.24 Admitting that such 
prejudices give a specific ‘horizon’, a ‘range of vision that includes everything that can be seen 
from a particular vantage point’,25 Gadamer calls for the ‘historically effected consciousness’ 
to be aware that interpretation requires the ‘fusion of horizons’ between the text and the reader, 
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through which the ‘old and new are always combining into something of living value’.26 To 
bring about this fusion in a regulated way is only possible through application. That is why, 
according to Gadamer, application is an essential element of interpretation and the only tool 
with which to bridge the gap ‘between then and now, between the Thou and the I’:27 
All reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part of the 
meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the text that he is reading. The line of meaning 
that the text manifests to him as he reads it always and necessarily breaks off in an open 
indeterminacy. He can, indeed he must, accept the fact that future generations will 
understand differently what he has read in the text.28 
A similar approach to the nature of interpretation and meaning, but through a linguistic 
lens, can be found in the philosophical theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein.29 Before outlining his 
theory, it is worth noting that in linguistic theories, a distinction is drawn between theories on 
semantic description of languages and theories which seek to determine the foundation of 
linguistic meaning. Theories of the first kind, which are called ‘semantics’, belong to logic and 
linguistics and are designed for studying the meaning of expression by elements of a language. 
In contrast, theories of the second kind are ‘foundational’ and aim to answer the most basic 
questions concerning linguistic meaning – questions about its very nature.30 That said, although 
these two types of theories are distinct, they are closely connected. That is why Donald 
Davidson, in approaching the question of ‘what is it for words to mean what they do?’, suggests 
asking two different questions: 1) what form should semantics take, and 2) what is it that makes 
a semantic theory correct for a particular language, ie what determines meaning?31 
Foundational theories of meaning are developed by the acknowledgment that the 
meanings of words cannot be derived from their physical properties or reduced to the real-
world objects to which they refer. Among different theories,32 Wittgenstein suggests that the 
                                                 
26 ibid 209. 
27 ibid 329. 
28 ibid 335. 
29 Gadamer himself acknowledges this similarity and notes: ‘I am really in complete agreement with the late 
Wittgenstein, and I call that hermeneutics!’ in Hans-Georg Gadamer and Rod Cotlman, A Century of Philosophy: 
Hans Georg Gadamer in Conversation with Riccardo Dottori (Bloomsbury Academic 2006) 74. For the detailed 
discussion on the asymmetry between the work of Gadamer and Wittgenstein see: Desiree Weber, ‘Interpreting 
Interpretation: Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Theory in Language and Politics’ (2007) Honors Projects 
<http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/10> accessed 24 September 2015. 
30 Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, ‘Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions’ in M García-Carpintero and M Kölbel (eds) 
The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Continuum 2012) 84. 
31 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Clarendon Press 1984) xiii. 
32 There are six main approaches to the foundational theories of meaning: a) Mentalist and intentionalist theories, 
as associated with Paul Grice, claims that the meanings of sentences are determined by the contents of the 
communicative intentions of users of those sentences. b) Interpretational theory, proposed by Davidson, asserts 
that meaning is determined by the ‘principle of charity’ on the basis of non-semantic facts about sentences held 
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meaning of an expression is determined by its use. In Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein 
argues that the meaning of any given linguistic expression is determined by the ‘language-
games’ in the community in which the expression is used.33 He asserts that language is not 
something fixed, ‘but new types of language, new language-game[s] … come into existence 
and others become obsolete and get forgotten’. The use of the word ‘language-game’ by 
Wittgenstein is meant to emphasise the reciprocal relationship that leads to meaning such that 
speaking of language can be described as ‘a form of life’.34 Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
the mediation of language-games in meaning is remarkably close to Gadamer’s understanding 
of the role of tradition. Both scholars speak of the relative stability of language and reject 
transcendental truth as the foundation of language. Similarly, language-games and the fusion 
of horizons explain how meaning is adjusted when two (or more) speakers are in dialogue.35 
The philosophical-linguistic approaches discussed above suggest that we do not 
discover meaning by limiting our vision to bare text, or to the original intentions of authors. 
Rather, the tradition and practices within a specific community determine the meanings of 
terms used in that community. It may be argued, however, that such a philosophical-linguistic 
insight on the dependency of meaning upon social practices and tradition cannot be applied to 
law, which is aimed at providing its subject with certainty and stability. For this reason, we 
must also consider the approaches of different legal theorists to the nature of interpretation. 
 
C. APPROACHES OF LEGAL THEORISTS TO THE NATURE OF 
INTERPRETATION 
Rejecting the intentionalist theory of meaning, Kelsen warns against believing the fiction that 
a legal norm admits of only one meaning as the ‘correct’ interpretation, because such a view 
falsely presents a purely political value judgment as scientific truth.36 For Kelsen, interpretation 
is ‘an intellectual activity, which accompanies the process of law application in its advance 
                                                 
true under observable circumstances by ideal interpreter. c) Casual theories as developed by Saul Kripke, suggest 
that the meaning of an expression is fixed neither by the thoughts of agents nor by what an ideal interpreter would 
say, but rather by the causes of utterances; d) Reference magnetism theory emphasises the relatively natural entities 
which serve as ‘magnets’ for expressions to refer to; e) Internalist theory, as developed by Noam Chomsky, 
suggests that linguistic expressions are related to inner states of speaker and hearers and communication depends 
on a similarity of these states. 
33 Ludwig Wittgenstein and GEM Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations: The English Text of the Third Edition 
(Prentice Hall 1958) para 7. 
34 ibid para 23. 
35 Gadamer in his preface to the second edition of his book Truth and Methods writes: ‘Wittgenstein’s concept of 
‘language-games’ seemed quite natural to me when I came across it.’ Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall (n 11) 
xxxvi footnote 13. See alsoWeber (n 29) 19. 
36 Kelsen (n 7) 356. 
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from a higher to a lower level’.37 In other words, interpretation is linked with the hierarchical 
structure of legal orders.38 The result of a legal interpretation, according to Kelsen, can only be 
the ascertainment of the frame which the law that is to be interpreted represents, and 
consequently, the cognition of several possibilities within the frame. 39  Kelsen rejects the 
possibility of a method that would reach only one correct answer or that would favor one 
interpretation over the other. To choose the ‘right’ interpretation, among other possibilities, ‘is 
not a question of cognition directed toward positive law... but of legal politics’.40 
Hart, as well, does not propose a theory of interpretation, although terms’ meanings 
play an important role in his theory. Hart’s approach to adjudication and the meanings of rules 
was inspired by the skepticism of the Realism movement of the 1930s.41 Hart asserts that to be 
able to regulate behavior, a rule ‘must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt 
about its application’.42 At the same time, a penumbra of debatable cases will exist in which 
words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously inapplicable. As a result of this approach, 
in Hart’s theory, there is a ‘core of certainty’ and ‘penumbra of doubt’, which conveys upon 
all rules a ‘fringe of vagueness’ or ‘open texture’.43 As such, the uncertainty which exists in all 
legal rules cannot be solved by logical deduction,44 or ‘mechanical deduction from rules with 
predetermined meaning’. 45  Hart therefore warns that judges as interpreters always make 
choices in penumbral cases, even if the judge as interpreter ‘either does not see or pretends not 
to see that the general terms of this rule are susceptible of different interpretations and that he 
has a choice left open uncontrolled by linguistic conventions’.46 Interpretation in these cases, 
according to Hart, should be done in the light of social aims,47 while respecting the judicial 
virtues: impartiality and neutrality in surveying the alternatives, consideration for the interests 
of all who will be affected by the judge’s decision, and a concern to deploy some acceptable 
general principle as a reasoned basis for decision.48 
Despite the distinction Hart makes between the ‘core’ meaning and the ‘penumbra’, he 
does not assume the existence of a transcendental or inherent meaning even in plain cases, as 
                                                 
37 ibid 348. 
38 Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (Routledge 2012) 105. 
39 Kelsen (n 7) 351. 
40 ibid 352-353. 
41 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
42 ibid 607. 
43 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 123. 
44 Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (n 41) 607. 
45 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 204. 
46 Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (n 41) 610. 
47 ibid 611. 
48 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 204. 
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he says that the plain cases, ‘where the general terms seem to need no interpretation and where 
the recognition of instances seems unproblematic or “automatic”’, are considered as plain 
because ‘there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying 
terms’.49 This indicates why Hart believes that the ‘application of law in concrete cases requires 
interpretation’,50 without distinguishing between hard and plain cases. In other words, it is the 
practices in a specific community that render the applicability of a rule unproblematic or 
automatic. Therefore, it can be concluded that meaning in Hart’s theory is not determined 
merely by reference to its semantics, but by ‘traditions’ in the community. 
Like other positivists, Raz rejects the possibility or necessity of giving any general 
theory of interpretation. However, he does discuss in detail what he understands the concept of 
interpretation to be. In doing so, Raz implicitly rejects the intentional theory by asserting that 
‘meaning is a public and social phenomenon’.51 He bases the foundation of meaning on ‘the 
dependence of language and other carriers of meaning on conventions’ and asserts that the 
existence of such conventions of meaning ‘in a certain population indicates that they all regard 
the same things as having the same meaning’.52 The ‘authoritative intention thesis’ is crucial, 
according to Raz, only for the legitimation of legislation, but it has no use as an aid to or method 
of interpretation. Put another way, ‘intention legitimates, but conventions interpret’.53 
Although he has not laid down a general theory of interpretation, Raz views 
interpretation as comprising ‘both the activity of explaining or displaying the meaning, and its 
product’.54 He attributes four focal features to interpretation in general,55 and three additional 
features which are specific to interpretation in law. Among these features, Raz particularly 
rejects the view that interpretation is limited to semantics, by stressing that a ‘good 
interpretation provides understating, not merely knowledge’ and that this element ‘in itself 
excludes the giving of a dictionary meaning, substitution of synonyms or near synonyms and 
translation’. 56  Nevertheless, Raz holds that there are ‘no useful universal recipes for 
                                                 
49 ibid 126. 
50 ibid 204. 
51 Raz claims that the focus should be on why we interpret and not on how to interpret. His reason for such a 
rejection has two aspects: on the moral end, no general theory of interpretation is possible because there is no 
moral theory capable of stating in specific terms ‘what is to be done in all the situation possible in a particular 
society’. On the side of establishing the content of law, a general theory is unnecessary mainly because ‘law-
makers know the ways in which their law is interpreted’. Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (OUP 
2009) 119-121. 
52 ibid 229. 
53 ibid 288-289. 
54 ibid 299. 
55 The four features are: interpretation is of an original; interpretation states or shows the meaning of an original; 
interpretation is subject to assessment as right or wrong; and interpretation is an intentional act. ibid 268. 
56 ibid 301. 
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interpretation’ because interpretations are guided by practice-based norms and constrained by 
the meaning of objects, both of which are subject to change over time. Thus, the only general 
guide is in understating what interpretation is for.57 
Lon Fuller asserts that the problem of interpretation occupies ‘a sensitive, central 
position in the internal morality of law’. 58  The reason that such centrality has not been 
recognised in all legal theories is because ‘law is regarded as a one-way projection of authority 
instead of being conceived as a collaborative enterprise’.59 Fuller maintains that meaning is 
derived from culture, such that when a legislator uses language, ‘he intends that language to 
have the meaning it has in his culture; he is himself a participant in that culture and he means 
by his words not what the dictionary says they mean, but what his fellow citizens would mean 
when they use them’.60 
For Fuller, language represents the ‘interactional phenomenon par excellence; its forms 
arise out of and live by interactions’, therefore, communication by words cannot be seen as a 
matter of ‘shipping packages of meaning from one head to another’.61 The meaning of a word 
cannot be resolved by recourse to the intentions of authors, but should be arrived at by the 
interpreter at the time of application of the words to a concrete context, because with ‘the 
passage of time’ some conception of ‘what is fit and proper’ will influence the text. And what 
is fit and proper in the concrete specific context of an interpreter’s local culture is ‘implicit in 
the practices and attitudes of the society of which he is a member’.62 
In his famous debate with Hart, Fuller attacks Hart’s core meaning theory by giving the 
example of punishing a man who falls asleep while waiting for a delayed train, in accordance 
with a rule providing that a man sleeping in a railway station is punishable; and with this 
argument that his sleep represents the ‘obvious instance’ contemplated by that law. 63  He 
criticises Hart’s theory of interpretation as a ‘pointer theory of meaning’ which focuses on the 
individual things, or distinct situations of facts, rather than toward general ideas or the 
significance of those facts in human affairs.64 In considering legal text, meaning is assigned 
not to a single word but to a sentence, a paragraph or a whole page or more of text; a paragraph 
surely does not have a ‘standard instance’ that remains ‘constant whatever the context in which 
                                                 
57 ibid 321-322. 
58 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 91. 
59 ibid 227. 
60 Lon L Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (Greenwood Press 1976) 58. 
61 Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 58) 227. 
62 Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (n 60) 59. 
63 Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630, 
664. 
64 Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 58) 84. 
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it appears’.65 Fuller maintains that Hart’s approach to interpretation is limiting the judicial 
process to what he labels as ‘cataloguing procedure’, which is contrary to the larger 
responsibilities that judges have to ‘treat’ a case.66 It becomes apparent that Fuller’s theory of 
interpretation is very close to the reciprocal interplay between text and reader with the 
mediation of tradition and practices. For example, he explains that interpretation should be 
done by understanding the implications contained in the practice. He also emphasises the 
importance of the ‘historically effected consciousness’ – that is, the interpreter who is equipped 
with the necessary imagination to put himself in the place of those whose past conduct towards 
one another is being interpreted.67 
The essentiality of tradition in interpretation is best manifested in Ronald Dworkin’s 
theory, in which legal interpretation is not considered as an activity sui generis, but ‘as a mode 
of knowledge’. 68  Dworkin considers legal practice to be an interpretive process. Judges 
disagree on how to decide cases because they disagree about what the law is. In other words, 
the interpretation of what the law is in any particular case depends upon the judge’s conception 
of law itself. Dworkin makes no distinction between understanding and interpretation,69 but 
distinguishes the interpretation of a conversation from the interpretation of a social practice, 
the latter of which aims to interpret something created by people as an entity distinct from 
them. He describes this as ‘constructive interpretation’, which is a matter of imposing purpose 
on an object or practice in order to make it the best possible example of the form or genre to 
which it is taken to belong.70 Rejecting the intentionalist theory of meaning, Dworkin uses the 
image of a chain novel with many authors to ground his concept of interpretation in history, 
‘not simply to discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said it, 
but to reach an opinion about what these judges have collectively done’.71 This constructive 
interpretation of the past should ‘fit’ the practice and show the value of law as a political 
enterprise.72 
                                                 
65 ibid 663. 
66 ibid 666. 
67 ibid 228-229. 
68 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179, 182. 
69 ‘We interpret the sounds or marks another person makes in order to decide what he has said’ in Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 50.  
70 ibid 51. 
71 Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (n 68) 193. 
72 ibid 194. 
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In his policy oriented approach to law, known as the New Haven School, Myres S 
McDougal approaches interpretation as a problem in communication,73 which should not be 
limited to the ‘arbitrary formalism’74 of the text of a treaty. He describes language as ‘non-
subjective events’ which mediate between the subjectivities of the communicator and the 
audience. 75  Thus, no act of communication is ever solely ‘subjective’ or entirely ‘non-
subjective’, but necessarily involves both simultaneously.76 As a result, interpretation not only 
includes the intentional foundation as the subjective element, but also the usage or conventional 
theories of meaning that exist in a given social setting. McDougal rejects Vattel’s maxim that 
‘it is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpretation’ as ‘an obscurantist 
tautology, since the determination of the question whether a text required, or did not require, 
interpretation was itself an interpretation’.77 McDougal goes on to argue that there is no such a 
thing as ‘plain and ordinary meaning’, because it is only by reference to the factual 
circumstances of words’ use that the meanings of words can be made particular and clear.78 
For Martti Koskenniemi, the meaning of a rule is not determined ‘from the inside’79 but 
derives from the practice of a legal community.80 In From Apology to Utopia, he engages with 
the semiological account of language of Ferdinand de Saussure to describe his concept of 
international law. Koskenniemi distinguishes between international legal arguments, doctrines 
and schools as a kind of parole which refers back to an underlying set of assumptions, as langue 
or ‘deep-structure’ of the law.81 Koskenniemi believes that the underlying assumptions of 
international law are based on contradictory premises. Therefore, international rules suffer 
from foundational indeterminacy which goes beyond the indeterminacy of language. 82 
Consequently, the problems of treaty interpretation are deeper than the unclear character of 
treaty language and ‘lie in the contradiction between the legal principles available to arrive at 
an interpretation’.83 
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Stanley Fish argues that knowledge is not objective but socially constituted. In other 
words, understanding is based on the presuppositions of the community in which one lives. 
Furthermore, the socially conditioned person, ie, everyone, cannot think beyond the limits 
made possible by his or her culture. As a result, meaning is not found in text but in the reader, 
or rather the interpretive community: ‘the reader’s activities are at the center of attention, where 
they are regarded not as leading to meaning but as having meaning’.84 As meaning is derived 
from the community, Fish believes that there is no correct interpretation that will always hold 
true. Therefore, ‘to consult dictionaries, grammars, and histories is to assume that meanings 
can be specified independently of the activity of reading’.85 
Fish agrees in general with Dworkin’s theory that interpretation is neither purely 
subjective nor objective, however, he blames Dworkin for ‘repeatedly fall[ing] away from his 
own best insight into a version of the fallacies (of pure objectivity and pure subjectivity)…’. 
86Fish believes that all of the individuals contributing to Dworkin’s metaphorical ‘chain novel’ 
are as much free as they are constrained, and there is no difference between the first novelists 
and the others: they are all constrained as they can only create and continue the novel within 
the constraints of ‘novel practice’; but they are free as ‘every decision a later novelist makes 
will rest on his assessment of the situation as it has developed’.87 As a result, unlike Dworkin, 
who believes that the judge ‘must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility 
to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own’,88 
Fish believes that as history does not have ‘the status of a brute fact’,89 it cannot constrain the 
interpreters. What constrains interpreters is ‘their tacit awareness of what is possible and not 
possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, and what will and will not be heard 
as evidence in a given enterprise…’. 90  They are tacitly aware of the possibilities of 
interpretation because they are members of interpretive communities, who ‘share interpretive 
strategies not for reading… but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning 
their intentions’. These interpretive strategies exist ‘prior to the act of reading and therefore 
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[determine] the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way 
around’.91 
In this way, the role of ‘interpretive strategies’ in Fish’s approach is similar to the 
concept of ‘tradition’ in Gadamer’s theory: it determines the specific ‘horizon’ of the reader. 
Fish, however, does not explain how these strategies are shaped. Accordingly, for Fish, the 
success or failure of interpretation depends on whether ‘[some]one else would be persuaded to 
my reading’,92 while for Gadamer interpretation is successful where the ‘fusion of horizons’ 
occurs, that is, when the historically situated author and the equally historically situated reader 
manage to create a shared meaning. 
The evaluation of the validity of considering ‘persuasion’ as the main criterion for 
determining a successful act of interpretation, in the face of the criticisms that are raised against 
Gadamer’s concept of the ‘fusion of horizons’,93 is beyond the limited scope of this paper.94 
The important point for this discussion is, however, that there is general agreement among the 
many different legal theorists mentioned above about the role of ‘tradition’ in giving meaning 
to the text. For example, whereas Raz talks about the ‘dependency of language and other 
carriers of meaning on conventions’, Fuller uses the more general term of ‘culture’. Likewise, 
Fish’s statement that there are no fixed texts, rather, it is the interpretive strategies that make 
them fixed,95 can be seen as analogous to Hart’s claim that plain cases are considered as such 
because ‘there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying 
terms’.96 
The general agreement among legal theorists on the inadequacy of semantics as an 
interpretative tool, the dependency of meaning upon social norms and tradition, and thus the 
relative stability of language, require the law to be understood ‘every moment, in every 
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concrete situation, in a new and different way’.97 That is why even major legal positivists such 
as Kelsen and Raz acknowledge the fact that a single legal text can admit of many 
interpretations. To explain how one object can have several valid interpretations, Raz gives the 
example of how different interpretations of Hamlet, such as psychoanalytic interpretations, can 
be valid even though the story has not changed. What has changed is the perspective – the 
particular reasons for paying attention to that object – which leads to a plurality of valid 
interpretations.98 
Of course, asserting the existence of such common elements in the nature of 
interpretation is by no means equivalent to denying the differences and subtleties of each school 
of thought discussed above. For example, while Dworkin argues that interpretation is essential 
to determining what the law is, he also holds that the perfect judge – the metaphorical Judge 
Hercules, who is invested with a super-human intellect – will always arrive at one right 
answer.99 In contrast, legal hermeneutics views interpretation as the activity of Judge Hermes, 
who acts within a network ‘that can be seen as an infinite volume of instantly available 
information from which the judge must draw’ his conclusion ‘in the dialectic play of these 
possibilities’.100 These differences, nonetheless, do not impede us from concluding that, given 
legal theorists’ recognition of the dependency of meaning upon social practices and tradition, 
legal interpretation, by its nature, is not an exception, and therefore, it is always mediated by 
the ‘tradition’ and ‘language-games’ that exists in a specific community. 
 
D. NEW READING OF ARTICLES 31 AND 32 OF THE VCLT 
This section applies the framework developed in the above theoretical discussion to the rules 
of interpretation in international law. In particular, this section asks whether the understanding 
of the nature of interpretation developed here is consistent with the system provided by the 
VCLT. Mindful of the controversies which exist concerning the interpretation of international 
law, the International Law Commission (the ‘Commission’) opted to codify relatively few rules 
as ‘the strictly legal basis for interpretation’.101 These articles are based on the view that the 
text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the parties’ intentions, and that the 
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starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation 
ab initio into the intentions of the parties.102 
VCLT’s emphasis on the texts of treaties has led many scholars to advocate for a textual 
approach to interpretation. The textual school places the principal emphasis on the actual words 
of a treaty, where the assumption is that the text has a meaning, not merely one given 
specifically to it by the drafters, but independently. This school finds its support in the 1956 
resolution of the Institute of International Law on interpretation103 and the formulation of the 
rules of interpretation proposed by Sir G Fitzmaurice based on the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),104 which assumes the existence of a ‘plain’ or ‘ordinary 
meaning’. 
There is no doubt about the importance of text in the process of interpretation. 
Interpretation cannot be performed in violation of the facts of a text, but would be an effort to 
establish those facts.105 Gadamer describes this as the ability to open ourselves to the superior 
claim that a text makes, and to respond to what it has to tell us; to be at its ‘service’, to 
subordinate ourselves to the text’s claim to dominate our minds, since ‘interpretation of law… 
is clearly not a form of domination but of service’.106 
Nevertheless, to assume that words have a ‘plain’ meaning independent from the 
tradition within which the word is used permits interpreters to interpret legal texts according to 
whatever seems suitable to them. This is because the meanings of words cannot be derived 
from their physical properties or reduced to the real-world objects to which they refer. Thus, 
the danger of the textual approach is that it opens the door to arbitrary interpretations. Because 
of this ambiguity, the textual approach may create greater uncertainty than an approach which 
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insists upon a comprehensive, contextual examination of all factors potentially relevant to 
common intent.107 
Likewise, there was no doubt among the members of the Commission that the text alone 
is not an adequate source for interpretation, that ‘no term had an inherent meaning, the meaning 
always depended on usage’,108 and that ‘a term in isolation had no meaning’.109 This belief was 
so strong that the term ‘natural’ for meaning was deleted immediately from the draft articles110 
as, in the words of Ago, ‘the meaning of a term [is] a convention created by the human mind’.111 
This position was reemphasised by Waldock in his answers to the comments raised by some 
states about the danger of textualism, saying that ‘with regard to the expression “ordinary 
meaning”, nothing could have been further from the Commission’s intention than to suggest 
that words had a “dictionary” or “intrinsic meaning in themselves.”’112 
For precisely these reasons, some members of the Commission doubted the usefulness 
of adding paragraph 4 of article 31, ‘special meaning’, to the rules of interpretation, and argued 
that it could safely be omitted because the so-called ‘special’ meaning would be the natural 
meaning in the particular context.113 The reason for retaining this paragraph was not because 
the Commission denied the fact that the technical or special meaning of a term is derived from 
its context. Rather, the Commission believed that ‘there was a certain utility in laying down a 
specific rule on the point, if only to emphasize that the burden of proof lies on the party 
invoking the special meaning of the term’.114 For this purpose, reference was made to the Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland case, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice held: 
‘The geographical meaning of the word “Greenland”, ie the name which is habitually used in 
the maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded as the ordinary meaning of the 
word. If it is alleged by one of the Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be 
attributed to it, it lies on that Party to establish its contention’.115 
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Another important element of the system of interpretation provided for by the VCLT is 
the supplementary role that is assigned to the intentions of the authors of a text. Article 32 of 
the VCLT considers the intentions of the parties as the supplementary element in the process 
of interpretation. This element is not meant to ‘provide for alternative, autonomous, means of 
interpretation but only for means to aid an interpretation governed by the principles contained 
in article [31]’.116 This approach is in line with Gadamer’s theory that in conceiving of the past, 
‘we regain the concepts of a historical past in such a way that they also include our own 
comprehension of them’.117 In other words, we can never access the intention of the parties 
objectively; rather, it is always mediated by our ‘prejudices’. 
In the face of the inadequacy of the text alone to serve as the basis of interpretation, on 
the one hand, and rejecting the intentions of the parties as the foundational bases of meaning, 
on the other hand, some scholars advocate for the idea that meaning should be ascertained 
according to the objective that the text is meant to serve. Fitzmaurice describes this teleological 
approach as another formulation of the rule ut res magis valeat quam pereat, or the principle 
of maximum effectiveness.118 In short, the text should be interpreted to have the fullest value 
and effect consistent with its wording and with the other parts of the text. 
The first draft articles on interpretation proposed by Waldock contained a separate 
article on effective interpretation119 for two reasons: its significance as the basis upon which it 
is justifiable to imply terms in a treaty for the purpose of giving efficacy to the intention of 
parties expressed in provisions of the treaty; and that in the sphere of implied terms, it sets the 
proper limits of the application of the principle, so that purely teleological interpretations are 
ruled out. 120  However, this proposal faced strong objections from the members of the 
Commission, who thought that insofar as this principle stated a logical rule, it was in any case 
implicit in the requirement of good faith and the reference to the object and purpose of the 
text.121 Ultimately, even Waldock himself was not in favor of retaining the maxim because the 
‘terms of the treaty itself [would determine] whether the application of the principle led to a 
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restrictive or to an extensive interpretation’. 122  Therefore, the specific rule on effective 
interpretation was deleted from the draft articles. 
Equating the teleological approach to the principle of effectiveness downgrades the 
process of interpretation to mere techniques, and thus renders the teleological approach 
insufficient in explaining the nature of interpretation. Even assuming a larger role for this 
approach does not make it a proper basis for explaining the nature of interpretation, since this 
approach either defines the object and purpose as what appears in the text, especially in the 
preamble, which then makes it a variant of the textual approach; or it seeks to define the object 
and purpose by going beyond the text and searching for the intentions of the parties, which 
makes it a variant of the subjective approach. 123 At best, this approach can only tell us how 
interpretation should be done. 
Nevertheless, it is still believed that the interpretive system provided by the VCLT does 
not take a strong position with respect to the doctrinal debates on treaty interpretation.124 
Therefore, the proponents of different interpretative approaches claim that the VCLT 
provisions privilege the method of their respective approach. The truth however, lies 
somewhere in the middle. While there is no doubt that text, along with the original intentions 
and purposes of laws, provides an important insight for the purposes of interpretation, the 
VCLT rules go beyond these and adopt a unique method based on the dependency of meaning 
upon tradition and practices. 
To illustrate this point, it should be noted that article 31 is formulated as a ‘General rule 
of interpretation’ in the singular form, and not as ‘General rules’. This formulation emphasises 
that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule; that all elements in article 
31 would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant 
interpretation. 125 
The rule that the ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract, but 
in the context of the treaty and in the light of its objects and purposes is, according to the 
Commission, necessary according to both common sense and good faith.126 The inclusion of 
the preamble and annexes in the ‘context’ is well settled. Any agreement relating to a treaty, 
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and any instrument which was made in connection with the conclusion of that treaty, ‘should 
not be treated as mere evidence to which recourse may be had for the purpose of resolving an 
ambiguity or obscurity, but as part of the context for the purpose of arriving at the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty’. 127  The Commission also introduced three extrinsic 
elements ‘to be taken into account together with the context’: agreement as to the interpretation 
of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty; any subsequent practice in the 
application; and any relevant rules of international law. 
The Commission emphasised that the ‘context’ was not meant to refer only to the text 
of the treaty but was designed to ‘link all the elements of interpretation mentioned in paragraph 
2 to the word ‘context’ in the first paragraph and thereby incorporate them in the provision 
contained in that paragraph. Equally, the opening phrase of paragraph 3 clarifies that the 
statement ‘“There shall be taken into account together with the context” [was] designed to 
incorporate in paragraph 1 the elements of interpretation set out in paragraph 3’.128 
Listing the primary sources for interpreting treaties as articulated in article 31, in the 
words of El-Erian, does not justify the establishment of a hierarchical order. Rather, it merely 
reflects the logical presentation of these sources. 129  This view is also reflected in the 
Commentary of the Commission on the rules of interpretation, highlighting the fact that the 
only reason for formulating article 31 in such a way is that these sources ‘have, in the nature 
of things, to be arranged in some order’. 130 In response to the comments raised during the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1969, Waldock explains that the intention of the Commission had 
been to place on the same footing all of the elements of interpretation mentioned in article 
31. 131  Therefore, ‘it is only logic which suggests that the elements in paragraph 3 (the 
subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation, subsequent practice establishing the 
understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation, and relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties) should follow and not precede the elements in 
the previous paragraphs’. And due to the ‘obligatory character’ of these elements, they cannot 
be considered ‘to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those, which precede 
them’.132 
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The technical discussion that exists among scholars about the requirements of each 
element listed in article 31 is beyond the scope of this paper. What is important for our 
discussion is that the elements listed in article 31 are either related to what is set by the parties, 
or to what the ‘tradition’ and ‘practice’ requires. These two categories of elements correspond 
to the two types of social norm theories of meaning: the conventionalist theory, which regards 
‘unambiguous linguistic usage, reached by agreement’ as the source of meaning; and, what 
Gadamer calls ‘customary usage’ theory, which sets limits to conventionalism in order to avoid 
arbitrariness in interpreting the meanings of words. To illustrate his theory, Gadamer gives the 
examples of children and lovers who have ‘their’ language ‘by which they communicate with 
each other in a world that belongs to them alone. But even this is not so much because they 
have arbitrarily agreed on it, but because a verbal custom has grown up between them’.133 
The nature of international law requires taking into account the ‘conventionalist theory’ 
to determine meaning based on the acts of the law’s subjects. At the same time, the nature of 
interpretation and understanding require us to understand legal terms through the mediation of 
the language-games that are present in a given tradition. This is achieved by the inclusion of 
‘the relevant rules of international law’ as the primary source for the interpretation of treaties. 
The determination of meaning by considering the ‘relevant rules of intentional law’ requires 
the consideration of not only the formal sources of international law, but also, as article 38(1)(d) 
of the ICJ Statute provides, of the judicial practices and doctrine for determination of rules of 
law.134 This means that in every interpretation of the terms of treaties, the text should be 
understood not only by reference to ‘what is agreed’ by the parties, but also in the light of the 
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relevant legal tradition.135 The essentiality of determining the meaning of terms in the virtue of 
the ‘relevant rules of international law’, or in other words, the ‘language-games’ that exist in 
international law, is best reflected in the following passage from one of the members of the 
Commission: 
The reference to the rules of international law was indispensable, for just as a term 
could only be understood in a sentence, a sentence only in an article, and an article only 
in the treaty as a whole, it was impossible to understand the treaty except within the 
whole international legal order of which it formed a part, which it influenced and by 
which it was influenced. A treaty was an act of will; the parties had reached agreement, 
but their agreement was not in vacuo; it was situated in a legal order. In using certain 
terms, the parties had in mind concepts and meanings established by the legal order.136 
The determination of meaning with reference to the ‘language-games’ of a particular 
community requires ‘other rules’ to be applied to a case which do not derive from the treaty 
under interpretation. It might be suggested that international tribunals are not entitled to apply 
the law that goes ‘beyond’ the four corners of the instrument that establishes the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal. This belief is caused by confusion in the concepts of ‘jurisdiction’ and the 
‘applicable law’. Although the jurisdiction of most international tribunals is limited to 
particular types of disputes, or disputes arising under particular treaties, this limited jurisdiction 
does not necessarily imply a limitation of the scope of the law applicable in the interpretation 
and application of those treaties.137 For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea provides that the Tribunal has ‘jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the 
interpretation and application of this Convention’, however, when deciding cases, it ‘shall 
apply this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this 
Convention’.138 Similarly, although without any express provision in the Statutes, the limited 
                                                 
135 In the Dialo case, the ICJ held that for interpreting the relevant previsions of ICCPR and African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights, ‘it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by … independent body 
that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty’. As a result, the Court referred not only 
to the practice of the Human Right Committee and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, but 
also to the practices of the ECtHR and IACHR. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) (Judgment) 2010 ICJ Rep 639, paras 66-68. 
136 Statements of Yasseen, ILC 871st Meeting (n 129) para 51. 
137 ILC Study on Fragmentation (n 124) para 45. 
138 Articles 288(1) and 293(1) of the UNCLOS. As an example, in Mauritius v UK, the Tribunal in addressing the 
challenge raised by Mauritius against Judge Greenwood, held that the law applicable to such arbitration is that to 
be found in Annex VII of the Convention ‘supplemented by the law and practice of international courts and 
tribunals in inter-State cases’. On the other hand, the Tribunal declared that the law developed by non-international 
organisations, such as IBA guidelines, or the practice of non inter-state tribunals cannot be considered as relevant. 
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v UK) (Reasoned Decision on Challenge, 30 November 
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jurisdiction of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals has not impeded the application of 
the sources, in particular customary law, 139 enshrined in article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
ICJ.140 
The distinction between jurisdiction and ‘other rules’ of international law which will 
be applied as a matter of interpretation is well reflected in the Pulp Mill on the River Uruguay 
judgment, in which the Court states that ‘in the interpretation of the 1975 Statute, taking 
account of relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the Parties, 
whether these are rules of general international law or contained in multilateral conventions to 
which the two states are parties, nevertheless has no bearing on the scope of the jurisdiction 
conferred on the Court … which remains confined to disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Statute’.141 This is because ‘interpretation does not “add” anything to the 
instrument that is being interpreted. It constructs the meaning of the instrument by a legal 
technique … that involves taking account of its normative environment’.142 That is why in the 
Oil Platforms case, the international law on the use of force was applied to determine the 
meaning of ‘necessity’ in Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran 
and the United States. The ICJ held that ‘the interpretation and application of that Article will 
necessarily entail an assessment of the conditions of legitimate self-defense under international 
law’, because ‘application of the relevant rules of international law relating to this question … 
forms an integral part of the task of interpretation’.143  Similarly, the Permanent Court of 
                                                 
<www.pca-cpa.org/Reasoned%20Decision%20on%20Challenge1fcb.PDF?fil_id=1782> accessed 21 July 2015, 
para 165. 
139 The prominent place of customary law in the practice of ICTY and ICTR has allowed one of the most 
significant innovations in the modes of criminal liability: the joint criminal enterprise. For further discussion on 
this see, for instance: Philippa Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (OUP 2013) 176. 
140 See, for example, Prosecutor v ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 
1998) para 414; and Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, 
Dragan Papic, Vladimir Santic (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 540.  
141 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) 2010 ICJ Rep 14, para 66. 
142 ILC Study on Fragmentation (n 124) para 447. 
143 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgment) 2003 ICJ Rep 161, paras 40-
41. While this case remains a controversial one, the operative paragraph (1), which, inter alia, evaluates the action 
of the US under the law of the use of force, was adopted by fourteen votes against two. Whereas the two dissenting 
judges had no objections to the application of international law on the use of force for interpretation of article XXI 
(see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh 109, and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Elaraby 133), a few 
judges, in their separate opinions, disagreed with the approach of the Court: Judge Odawa and Judge Kooijmans 
did not reject the interpretation of the article by reference to other rules, however they believed that, due to the 
limited jurisdiction of the Court, only the necessary elements of international law on the use of force should have 
been considered (Separate Opinion of Judge Odawa paras 35-40; Separate Opinion of Judge Koojimans para 52); 
Judge Higgins argued that the Court should have interpreted the particular provisions in light of general 
international law, as to their ‘specific terms’ and not to essentially replace them with the law on armed attack and 
self-defense (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins paras 48-50); and Judge Buergenthal believed that the 
interpretation of that article in light of the international law on the use of force exceeded the Court’s jurisdiction 
(Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal paras 20-32). On the other side, it suffices to quote Judge Koroma, who 
stated that ‘the Court applied this rule, as it was bound to do, and came to the conclusion that the Article was not 
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Arbitration in Iron Rhine arbitration held that: ‘it is to be recalled that Article 31, paragraph 3, 
subparagraph (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes reference to “any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. For this 
reason … the Tribunal has examined any provisions of European law that might be considered 
of possible relevance in this case … Provisions of general international law are also applicable 
to the relations between the Parties, and thus should be taken into account in interpreting Article 
XII of the 1839 Treaty of Separation and Article IV of the Iron Rhine Treaty. Further, 
international environmental law has relevance to the relations between the Parties’.144 
To adhere to the idea that a tribunal may not be entitled to apply the relevant rules of 
international law in treaty interpretation is to hold that ‘once [s]tates conclude a bilateral treaty, 
they create a vacuum that consists precisely of this type of exclusion’.145 To avoid such a result, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body has rejected the idea that the covered 
treaties form a closed system, and has held that WTO agreements should not be read ‘in clinical 
isolation from public international law’.146 Thus, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case, 
held that the concept of ‘exhaustible natural resources’ in article XX(g) of GATT should be 
interpreted within current ‘tradition’ in international law and, as a result, it referred, among 
other instruments, to the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, the Biodiversity Convention of 
1992, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Appellate Body thereby 
reached the conclusion that all natural resources, living and non-living, were included in the 
concept ‘exhaustible natural resources’.147 This example, as well as the ones discussed above, 
show clearly that the theoretical approach provided in this paper is not a radical departure from 
what is already being done. On the contrary, it maps onto current practice and provides a sound 
foundation to understand why tradition is so important to interpretation in the context of 
international law. 
 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper provides a theoretical approach to the nature of interpretation in international law 
by adhering to the approaches of Gadamer and Wittgenstein. Such philosophical-linguistic 
                                                 
intended to operate wholly independently of general international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of 
justifying, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the Treaty, the unlawful use of force’ (Declaration 
of Judge Koroma 66). 
144 Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium v Netherlands) (Decision of 24 May 2005) RIAA Vol XXVII. 35-125, para 58. 
145 ILC Study on Fragmentation (n 124) para 460. 
146 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, 17. 
147  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (6 November 1998) 
WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, 2794-2797, paras 127-131. 
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approaches suggest that we do not discover meaning by limiting our vision to bare text, or to 
the original intentions of authors. Rather, the ‘tradition’ and ‘language-games’ within a specific 
community determine the meanings of terms used in that community. While the applicability 
of such an insight to law, which is aimed at providing its subject with certainty and stability, 
might be questioned, reviewing the approaches of different legal theorists reveals that, despite 
their differences, the dependency of meaning upon social practices and tradition is 
acknowledged by all of them. Therefore, it is concluded that legal interpretation, by its nature, 
is no exception and is always mediated by the ‘tradition’ and ‘language-games’ of specific 
communities. 
This finding paves the way for a new reading of the system of interpretation provided 
by articles 31 and 32 of VCLT. It is argued that although the VCLT integrates some of the 
elements of current interpretive methods, ultimately it adopts its own unique approach based 
on the dependency of meaning upon ‘tradition’. Whereas the nature of international law 
requires one to take into account the ‘conventionalist theory’ and to determine meaning based 
on the acts of the law’s subjects, the nature of interpretation requires that the terms be 
understood with the mediation of the ‘language-games’ existing in that community. This is 
recognised in the VCLT system of interpretation by the inclusion of ‘the relevant rules of 
international law’ as the primary source for the interpretation of treaties. Therefore, according 
to the VCLT rules, in every interpretation of the terms of treaties, the text should be understood 
not only by reference to what the law’s subjects have agreed or will agree on, but also, and 
more importantly, in light of the relevant legal ‘tradition’. 
 
